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Improved Model Exploration for the Relationship between Moral Foundations and Moral 
Judgment Development Using Bayesian Model Averaging 
Abstract 
Although some previous studies have investigated the relationship between moral 
foundations and moral judgment development, the methods used have not been able to fully 
explore the relationship. In the present study, we used Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in 
order to address the limitations in traditional regression methods that have been used previously. 
Results showed consistency with previous findings that binding foundations are negatively 
correlated with post-conventional moral reasoning and positively correlated with maintaining 
norms and personal interest schemas. In addition to previous studies, our results showed a 
positive correlation for individualizing foundations and post-conventional moral reasoning. 
Implications are discussed as well as a detailed explanation of the novel BMA method in order to 
allow others in the field of moral education to be able to use it in their own studies.   
Keywords: Bayesian Statistics; Bayesian Model Averaging; Moral Foundations; Moral 
Judgment Development 
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Improved Model Exploration for the Relationship between Moral Foundations and Moral 
Judgment Development Using Bayesian Model Averaging 
Introduction 
In the present study, we explored the relationship between moral foundations and moral 
judgment development with the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) method that allows the 
comparison of multiple candidate models. The theoretical frameworks of our study are based on 
the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) that proposes five different moral foundations and the 
Neo-Kohlbergian theory that presents three different moral schemas. Instead of testing a specific 
regression model based on a specific hypothesis, to better conduct data-driven exploration, we 
employed the BMA method. We explored the BMA-identified models that predicted three 
individual schemas of moral reasoning by moral foundations as independent variables and 
evaluated the performance of the models. At the same time, we also introduced novel data 
exploration to the community of moral education researchers for improvement of research 
methodology in the field. 
Moral Foundations and Moral Judgment Development 
The MFT argues that the basis of moral judgment and moral decision-making are not 
unidimensional but multidimensional and diverse (Graham et al., 2011). In the MFQ researchers’ 
original research, they proposed five different foundations for morality: harm and care (HC; 
avoiding potential harms to others), fairness and reciprocity (pursuing justice in sharing; FR), 
ingroup and loyalty (taking care of one’s own group, family, nation; IL), authority and respect 
(respecting legitimate authority and convention; AR), and purity and sanctity (avoiding 
disgusting entities including actions; PS) (Graham et al., 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 
People differently value these five foundations when they consider morality and make moral 
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decisions. According to the MFT, people’s perspectives, such as political and religious 
orientations, significantly influence which foundations are highly regarded. For instance, binding 
foundations, IL, AR, and PS, which are about binding social and community bonds, are highly 
valued by conservatives, while liberals more focus on individualizing foundations, HC and FR 
(Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). These foundations have been found to be 
associated with the pattern of one’s moral judgment and decision-making (e.g., Vaughan, Bell 
Holleran, & Silver, 2019; Winterich, Zhang, & Mittal, 2012). In addition to moral judgment and 
decision-making, other domains in moral functioning in general, such as empathy, were also 
found to be associated with moral foundations. For instance, Hannikainen, Hudson, Chopik, 
Briley, and Derringer (2020) reported that individualizing foundations were positively correlated 
with empathic concern and perspective taking.   
The proponents of the MFT argued that the cognitive developmental model of moral 
judgment, i.e., Kohlbergian and Neo-Kohlbergian theories, cannot explain the diverse nature of 
morality (Graham et al., 2011). According to Kohlbergian and Neo-Kohlbergian theories, moral 
judgment development can be explained in terms of the sophistication of post-conventional (PC) 
moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a). Neo-Kohlbergians, 
who updated Kohlbergian theory, proposed that moral judgment development is associated with 
the likelihood of the utilization of three schemas, personal-interest (PI), maintaining norms (MN) 
and PC schemas, in making moral judgment (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999b). A 
person with well-developed moral reasoning is likely to make judgments based on PC and 
universal moral principles, and less likely to rely on existing social norms or prioritize personal 
interests.  
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A widely used quantitative tool to measure one’s moral judgment development is the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT quantifies one’s likelihood to utilize each of PC, MN, and 
PI schemas in moral dilemma solving. Particularly, the PC schema score, the P-score, has been 
used as an index for the development of PC reasoning (Han, Dawson, Thoma, & Glenn, 2020). 
Its updated version, the DIT-2, provides an additional index, the N2 score as an index for the 
overall sophistication of moral reasoning, which represents to what extent one prefers the PC 
schema against the MN and PI schema (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999). Prior studies 
using these tools have shown that the presence of PC moral reasoning is positively associated 
with moral motivation and behavior (see Thoma (2002) and (2006) for review).  
However, the MFT proponents criticized that such theoretical frameworks only focus on 
individualizing foundations, not binding foundations, in explaining the PC schema. They argued 
that the Kohlbergian and Neo-Kohlbergian theories are biased due to the most sophisticated 
moral reasoning, PC reasoning, mainly addressing individualizing values, such as justice and 
fairness, while valuing other important foundations relatively less (Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 
1983; Graham et al., 2011). For instance, conservatives are more likely to receive lower DIT 
scores, particularly PC scores, compared with liberals because they highly value binding 
foundations but not because their moral reasoning is less developed (Graham et al., 2011). Thus, 
investigating the relationship between moral foundations and moral judgment development with 
empirical data is necessary to examine such points of concern. 
Two previous studies have examined this relationship. Correlational analysis in Baril and 
Wright's (2012) study (Study 1) reported that the DIT PC score was negatively associated with 
IL and AR, while the DIT MN score was positively associated with the two foundations; the DIT 
PI was only positively associated with IL. In general, they found a significant association 
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between two binding foundations and DIT schemas. However, they could not find any direct 
association between moral reasoning and individualizing foundations although the 
(individualizing– binding) score showed significant correlation with the PC score. Glover et al. 
(2014) used structural equation modeling to examine the relationship between two MFQ latent 
variable scores, individualizing and binding foundation scores, and the DIT-2 N2 and schema 
scores. They reported significant association between DIT-2 scores and binding foundations. 
However, similar to Baril and Wright's (2012) study, individualizing foundations did not show 
any significant association with DIT-2 scores.  
Interestingly, the aforementioned previous studies consistently reported non-significant 
association between individualizing foundations and moral reasoning. The PC moral reasoning is 
related to the consideration of universal moral principles (Kohlberg, 1981), and individualizing 
foundations, HC in particular, are deemed to constitute the basis of such principles by several 
social psychologists (Gray & Keeney, 2015; Gray & Schein, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2018). 
Hence, it would be generally expected that individualizing foundations, at least HC, would show 
meaningful relation with PC reasoning. However, the two previous studies that employed both 
theoretical frameworks, the MFT and moral judgment development, could not find any direct 
association between individualizing foundations and PC reasoning. 
In addition, the methodological aspects would also warrant further investigations on the 
relationship between moral foundations and reasoning. Although the previous studies examined 
the relationship with quantitative approaches, we decided to employ a novel analysis method to 
address their methodological limitations. Further details about these limitations are elaborated in 
the following section introducing the BMA method as an alternative statistical approach.  
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Bayesian Model Averaging 
As a way to properly explore the relationship between moral foundations and moral 
judgment development we employed the BMA method. The previous studies used frequentist 
analysis methods, which are only suitable for testing specific null hypotheses but not for model 
exploration. For instance, they used P-values to examine whether the variables of interest were 
significant. This is not an ideal interpretation since p-values can only provide information about 
null hypotheses, but not alternative hypotheses that researchers are mainly interested in 
(Wagenmakers et al., 2017). In addition, when the frequentist analysis is applied in regression, 
only one regression model can be tested (Raftery, 1995). Thus, even if p < .05 is reported, it does 
not necessarily mean that the tested regression model is the best model among possible 
alternative models consisting of possible combinations of tested independent variables. Although 
there are several methods to seek the best model based on the frequentist perspective, such as the 
stepwise regression, statisticians have warned that such methods are not ideal for the purpose 
because they could not properly address several critical issues such as inflation of false positives 
and potential multicollinearity (Hammami, Lee, Ouarda, & Lee, 2012; Harrell, 2015; Tibshirani, 
1997), as well as overfitting (McNeish, 2015). Given that it is difficult to identify the best model 
with the traditional method, a predicted regression model is likely to be overfitted to the data 
used for regression. Then, the model could not well explain the reality out of the boundary of the 
used data.  
Model selection methods based on a different perspective, Bayesian perspective, are 
possible ways to address the aforementioned issues. In particular, BMA is one of the most 
widely used Bayesian methods for model exploration (Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 
1999). The BMA process starts with assigning the prior probabilities of candidate predictors. As 
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a default option, the BMA package implemented in R employs 50% as the prior probability, P(H) 
(Raftery, Hoeting, Volinsky, Painter, & Yeung, 2020); this means that at the beginning, the 
probability to be non-zero and included in a regression model of each candidate predictor is 50%. 
Then, through iterative observation processes, the prior probabilities are updated with data and 
the posterior probabilities, P(H|D)s, are calculated with Bayes’ theorem (Wagenmakers et al., 
2018). P(H|D) is the probability that a specific candidate predictor is non-zero given data 
(Raftery, 1995). At the end of the iterative updating process, the best model can be identified by 
comparing the probabilities between alternative models consisting of combinations of candidate 
predictors (Raftery et al., 2020). As a result, a model reporting the highest probability, which 
includes predictors with high P(H|D)s, can be selected as the best model. 
The BMA method is better than the traditional regression method for model selection in 
several aspects. First, it allows comparison between multiple alternative candidate models 
instead of testing only one model (Raftery, 1995). Related to this point, the BMA method allows 
us to address the issue of model uncertainty (Raftery, Madigan, & Hoeting, 1997). If we test only 
one single model with the traditional regression model, we cannot address model uncertainty 
regarding the extent to which the tested model is likely to be the true model given data (George 
& Clyde, 2004), as no other alternative model is tested. The BMA method provides information 
for the Bayesian posterior probability by comparing the multiple candidate models (George & 
Clyde, 2004), so we can quantitatively examine model uncertainty with this method. Second, 
because the Bayesian method utilizes the posterior probabilities of predictors that directly 
address whether the predictors are non-zero (alternative hypotheses), unlike P-values that only 
address null hypotheses, it is epistemologically better than the traditional method (Han, Park, & 
Thoma, 2018). Third, in general, BMA tends to penalize complex models with unnecessary 
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predictors, so it is robust against overfitting. Concrete examples have shown that BMA-identified 
models more accurately predicted dependent variables out of the boundary of data used for 
regression compared with the regression models predicted by ordinary linear regression (Hoeting 
et al., 1999). Thus, we expected that BMA would be able to address the aforementioned 
methodological limitations in the previous studies that examined the relationship between moral 
foundations and reasoning. 
Present Study 
In the present study, we explored the best regression models for predicting the bDIT 
schema scores, PC, MN, and PI scores, with moral foundations. By employing the BMA method, 
we examined which moral foundation variables should be included in and excluded from the best 
regression models. To control the effects of political and religious backgrounds, we used 
political and religious affiliation variables as covariates during the model selection process. Once 
the best models were identified by the BMA method, we examined whether the BMA-identified 
models were statistically better compared with the full models including all candidate predictors, 
which were similar to the models predicted by traditional regression methods in the prior studies. 
We compared Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Bayes 
Factor, and cross-validation performance between the two different types of models. Finally, we 
discussed the meanings and implications of the findings from the BMA process. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were college students recruited from a university located in the Southern 
United States of America. Participants were enrolled in courses in psychology or educational 
psychology and invited to sign up for an online subject pool and provided with a link to a 
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Qualtrics survey. When they completed the survey, a course credit was offered to them as 
compensation. The design of the present study and consent form were reviewed and approved by 
the Institutional Review Board. 
Data collected from a total of 461 participants (14.32% male, 85.68% female) were 
analyzed in the present study. Their mean age was 22.50 years (SD = 6.80 years). The 
composition of the participants’ political affiliations was: 44.25% Republicans, 27.77% 
Democrats, 14.53% independents, 3.25% Libertarians, .22% Green Party, and 9.98% other. The 
participants’ religious affiliations were: 24.73% Catholics, 20.61% Evangelical Protestants, 
13.02% non-Evangelical Protestants, 10.63% spiritual but not religious, 4.56% Agnostic, 3.25% 
Atheistic, .65% Jewish, .43% Muslims, .22% Hindis, and 21.91% other. 
Materials 
Behavioral Defining Issues Test 
We employed the Behavioral DIT (bDIT), which is a shortened version of the original 
DIT more suitable for behavioral experiments and online studies, to examine participants’ moral 
judgment development (Han, Dawson, Thoma, et al., 2020). The bDIT consists of three moral 
dilemmas, Heinz and the Drug, Escaped Prisoner, and Newspaper, and the overall organization is 
similar to that of the original DIT. First, participants were presented with each moral dilemma. 
Then, they were asked to choose their behavioral option. For instance, after presenting Heinz and 
the Drug, participants were asked whether they shall steal the drug or not. After making the 
behavioral choice, a total of eight items were presented that asked what the most important moral 
philosophical rationale in the decision-making was. In each of the eight items, three rationale 
options, one corresponding to each schema, were offered. As three dilemmas were presented, a 
total of 24 items (8 per dilemma) were presented. 
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Then, three individual schema scores were calculated: a PC (P-score equivalent), MN, 
and PI score. Each schema score was calculated as follows:  
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑎	𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 	
#	𝑜𝑓	𝑎	𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛	𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑎	𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
24 × 100 
For instance, when a participant selected PC options 12 times out of all 24 items, their PC 
score becomes 12 / 24 x 100 = 50. The resultant schema scores are similar to the schema scores 
calculated from the original DIT. For example, the bDIT PC score is conceptually equivalent to 
the P-score from the original DIT (Han, Dawson, Thoma, et al., 2020), which has been used as 
an indicator of sophisticated moral reasoning (Rest & Narvaez, 1994). 
Previous studies testing the reliability of the bDIT showed that the internal consistency 
was at least acceptable (> .60) (Choi, Han, Dawson, Thoma, & Glenn, 2019; Han, Dawson, 
Thoma, et al., 2020). The bDIT showed good internal consistency in the present study as well (α 
= .77). Additionally, the internal consistency was at least acceptable in all three schemes, α = .80 
in PC, α = .80 in MN, and α = .74 in PI, respectively. Moreover, the previous studies reported 
that the PC score calculated from the bDIT and that from the original DIT, the P-score, were 
very highly correlated with each other (Choi et al., 2019; Han, Dawson, Thoma, et al., 2020). 
The bDIT PC score also showed good convergent validity in terms of significant correlation with 
other moral psychological indicators (Han, Dawson, Choi, Choi, & Glenn, 2020), such as the 
moral and general growth mindset (Dweck, 2000; Han, Choi, Dawson, & Jeong, 2018), empathic 
concern and perspective taking (Davis, 1983), moral internalization (Aquino & Reed II, 2002), 
and moral disengagement (Moore, Detert, Klebe Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012). Given these, 
the bDIT can be a reliable and valid test as a shortened version of the original in situations where 
the DIT is difficult to administer, such as experimental and online studies that use multiple 
measures. 
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Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
We used the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) to measure participants’ scores for 
five moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011). This questionnaire consists of a total of 30 items 
that were designed to assess participants’ perceived importance of each moral foundation in 
moral judgment. Each subscale score was calculated by averaging six items assigned to the 
subscale. Answers were anchored to a six-point Likert scale. The items asked whether each 
foundation was relevant to participants (e.g., “whether or not someone suffered emotionally”; 0: 
not at all relevant-5: extremely relevant) or whether they agreed with the statement about the 
foundation (e.g., “compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue”; 0: strongly 
disagree-5: strongly agree). All five subscales showed at least acceptable internal consistency: 
HC .70, FR .68, IL .73, AR .72, and PS .78.  
Procedure 
We recruited participants from psychology and educational psychology subject pool 
systems. They signed up for our study and received a link to our Qualtrics survey. Once they 
completed the consent procedure, they were randomly presented with the bDIT and MFQ. After 
completing the tests, participants were asked to complete a demographics survey form. Then, 
they were referred to the pool system again in order to receive a course credit as compensation. 
Analysis  
We used R to analyze the data. Before starting model exploration, we examined the 
descriptive statistics of the variables of interest, the bDIT schema and MFQ subscale scores. In 
addition, we conducted correlation analysis. Since multiple correlation coefficients were tested, 
the false positive discovery rate (FDR) correction was performed. 
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To search for the best model, we employed the BMA method implemented in an R 
package, BMA. Based on Bayesian statistics, BMA calculates the posterior probability of each 
candidate model, which indicates to which extent the model is favored by data (Raftery et al., 
2020). Then, a model with the highest posterior probability was identified as the best model to be 
selected (Hoeting et al., 1999). We performed three BMA processes to search for the best models 
predicting three dependent variables, bDIT-PC, MN, and PI scores. As candidate predictors, five 
MFQ subscale scores were entered into the model. In addition, participants’ political and 
religious affiliations were used as control variables and transformed into dummy variables. Once 
the BMA process was completed, we identified the model with the highest posterior probability 
as the best model. 
To evaluate the identified models, we compared the BMA-identified and full models with 
AIC, BIC, Bayes Factors, and cross-validation performance. First, we created two linear 
regression models, the BMA-identified and full models, with lm function. Then, both AIC and 
BIC were calculated in order to determine which model had smaller AIC and BIC values, which 
is deemed better than the other (Zucchini, Claeskens, & Nguefack-Tsague, 2016). 
Second, a Bayes Factor that indicates which model is relatively more probable than the 
other given data was employed; for instance, if two models, M1 and M2 are compared, a Bayes 
Factor BF12, P(D|M1)/P(D|M2), quantifies to which extent evidence supports M1 against M2 
(Han, Park, et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 2018). We calculated and compared Bayes Factors 
of the BMA-identified and full models with the BayesFactor package (Morey, Rouder, Jamil, 
Urbanek, & Ly, 2018). According to the guidelines suggested by Bayesian statisticians (Kass & 
Raftery, 1995), we concluded that when BFBMAFull = P(D|MBMA)/P(D|MFull) > 3, evidence 
positively supports the BMA-identified model against the full model, when BFBMAFull > 6, 
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evidence strongly supports, and when BFBMAFull >10, evidence very strongly supports (Kass & 
Raftery, 1995). 
Third, we examined whether the BMA-identified model was more robust against 
overfitting compared with the full models with K-fold cross-validation. K-fold cross-validation 
examines whether a regression model can predict phenomena out of the boundary of the data 
used for regression (Han, Lee, & Soylu, 2020). When this method is employed, 1/K of the whole 
dataset is randomly sampled and used for validation. Then, regression is performed with the rest 
of the dataset (1-1/K). In our study, we used 50% of the dataset for validation and the remaining 
50% for regression as we employed 2-fold cross-validation. The validation dataset, which was 
not used to estimate coefficients, is entered into the regression model to predict the dependent 
variable. We used the mean squared error (MSE) with the validation dataset for model 
evaluation. The MSE in our study was calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 	
1
𝑁<(𝑦?! − 𝑦!)
" 
Where N is the size of the validation dataset, 𝑦?! is the predicted value and 𝑦! is the actual 
value of the dependent variable. When two models’ MSEs are compared, the smaller MSE 
indicates the better model (Browne, 2000). We examined whether the MSE calculated with the 
validation dataset was smaller in the BMA-identified model compared with the full model. We 
repeated this procedure 10,000 times for randomization. We performed frequentist and Bayesian 
t-tests to compare the models predicting PC, MN, and PI scores. 
Readers interested in technical further details of statistical analyses may refer to the Open 
Science Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/vtrxu/), where all data and source code files were 
shared. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The result from correlation analysis 
was also reported in the same table. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis result 
  M (SD) bDIT PC bDIT MN bDIT PI MFQ HC MFQ FR MFQ IL MFQ AR 
bDIT PC 50.91 (21.44) - 
      
bDIT MN 29.25 (19.33) -.49*** - 
     
bDIT PI 18.99 (14.58) -.27*** -.23*** - 
    
MFQ HC 4.60 (.79) .16** -.08 -.14* - 
   
MFQ FR 4.46 (.72) .21*** -.15* -.11 .72*** - 
  
MFQ IL 3.87 (.87) -.23** .15* .15* .43*** .34*** - 
 
MFQ AR 4.13 (.83) -.21*** .17** .05 .48*** .41*** .76*** - 
MFQ PS 3.99 (.96) -.18** .16** .06 .45*** .39*** .65*** .73*** 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. All p-values were corrected for FDR.  
Model selection with Bayesian Model Averaging 
Table 2 presents the best models predicting bDIT PC, MN, and PI scores that were 
selected with the BMA method. The best models reported the greatest posterior probability 
values. The estimated coefficients and standard errors of predictors and covariates that were 
included in each best model are also presented in the table.  
Table 2 
BMA-identified regression models 
    bDIT PC bDIT MN bDIT PI 
 
Variable B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
BAYESIAN MODEL AVERAGING 16 
Intercept   35.41 (5.86) 32.25 (5.66) 23.89 (4.08) 
MFQs MFQ HC 5.47 (1.63) - -4.65 (.91) 
 
MFQ FR 7.03 (1.72) -7.12 (1.26) - 
 
MFQ IL -6.19 (1.33) - 4.30 (.83) 
 
MFQ AR - 6.93 (1.10) - 
 
MFQ PS -4.77 (1.22) - - 
Covariates Independent 6.85 (2.55) - - 
 
Libertarian - 12.12 (4.70) - 
  Non-Evangelical Protestant 10.54 (2.44) - - 
Note. Estimated coefficients and standard errors were displayed only when respective predictors 
were included in the best models. Covariates other than being Independent, Libertarian, and 
Non-Evangelical Protestant were not selected in any best model. Reference group: Republican 
(political affiliation) and Catholic (religious affiliation). 
Comparison with the full model 
We compared the BMA-identified and the full models, which included all candidate 
predictors and covariates. First, AIC and BIC were compared between the two different types of 
models. AIC was smaller in the BMA-identified model versus the full model when bDIT PC 
(4,007.23 vs. 4,008.40) and PI scores were predicted (3,747.25 vs. 3,764.38); however, the full 
model reported the smaller AIC in predicting the bDIT MN score (3987.37 vs. 3991.13). When 
BIC was compared, the BMA-identified models reported the smaller BIC compared with the full 
models in all cases, predicting bDIT PC (4,040.29 vs. 4,095.20), MN (4,011.80 vs. 4,074.17), 
and PI scores (3,763.78 vs. 3,851.18). 
Second, we compared Bayes Factors between two different types of models. In all cases, 
the BMA-identified models were very strongly supported against the full models by evidence 
(BFBMAFull ≥ 10). In predicting the bDIT PC, the calculated BFBMAFull was 1,639.85. When the 
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bDIT MN was predicted, BFBMAFull was 463.64. In the prediction of the bDIT PI, the resultant 
BFBMAFull was 528,770.60. 
Finally, we performed 2-fold cross-validation with 10,000 iterations to test whether the 
BMA-identified models were more robust against overfitting compared with the full models. As 
reported in Table 3, in all cases, the BMA-identified models showed smaller MSEs. Both 
frequentist and Bayesian t-tests consistently reported that the non-zero differences were very 
strongly supported by evidence.  
Table 3 
Results from 2-fold cross-validation 
  
BMA model MSE Full model MSE 
t p 
 
Cohen's D 
 
BF 
Mean over 10,000  
iterations SD 
Mean over 10,000  
iterations SD 
bDIT PC 18.76 .64 19.10 .69 -35.70 < .001 -.50 2.35E+266 
bDIT MN 18.37 .68 18.78 .75 -41.33 <.001 -.58 9.75E+353 
bDIT PI 14.10 .47 14.57 .51 -68.10 <.001 -.96 2.42E+903 
Discussion 
In the present study, we explored the best models that predicted bDIT schema scores with 
five individual moral foundations using the BMA method. We controlled for the effects from 
political and religious backgrounds since they are considered to be associated with one’s moral 
foundations and reasoning. The results showed that first, the PC schema was positively 
associated with both individualizing foundations, while two binding foundations, IL and PS, 
showed negative association. Second, the MN schema was positively associated with AR, but 
negatively associated with FR. Third, the PI schema score showed positive correlation with IL 
and negative correlation with HC. The BMA-identified models showed better performance 
compared with the full models, which are employed in the frequentist analysis, in terms of 
BAYESIAN MODEL AVERAGING 18 
information criteria (except the AIC in the case of bDIT MN), Bayes Factors, and robustness 
against overfitting (cross-validation performance). 
In general, findings regarding the relationship between binding foundations and moral 
judgment development from the present study are coherent with what has been proposed in 
theories in moral psychology and moral development. With the BMA method, we were able to 
successfully explore the specified contribution of each individual binding foundation to each 
schema score, which could not be well examined in the prior studies using the traditional 
regression method. The findings from the BMA-identified model prediction in the present study 
are consistent with previous studies in terms of the relationship between moral foundations and 
reasoning. As Baril and Wright (2012) and Glover et al. (2014) reported, we found the negative 
association between binding foundations, IL and PS, and the PC reasoning. The MN and PI 
schema scores were positively associated with AR and IL, respectively. One interesting point 
was that two binding foundations showed significant association with either the MN or PI score. 
Given that the MN schema concerns abiding by and valuing social norms and conventions while 
making moral judgments (Thoma, 2014), it is not surprising to see that AR, which is about 
following legitimate authority and respecting conventions (Haidt & Graham, 2007), was a 
significant predictor for the MN score. IL, on the other hand, focuses on taking care of one’s own 
group members, such as close others (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Since the PI schema is related to 
prioritizing close relationships rather than larger social systems (Thoma, 2014), it is also 
reasonable to see that IL significantly predicted the PI schema score.  
Moreover, in general, the reported associations between individualizing foundations and 
schema scores seem consistent with what Gray and Keeney (2015) argued about the universality 
of the HC foundation in moral judgment. Given that both the most and least sophisticated 
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schemas showed significant association with HC, HC can be considered as one of the most 
fundamental moral principles that has developmental implications (Schein & Gray, 2018). Also, 
the fact that the BMA-identified models, which is a parsimonious model with the most essential 
predictors (Clyde, 2000), included HC might empirically support the aforementioned point. HC 
negatively predicted the PI schema score perhaps due to the fact that the PI schema is mainly 
concerned with welfare within the boundary of one’s close others, instead of potential harms to 
society beyond the boundary (Thoma, 2014), while HC is more about universal moral concerns 
(Schein & Gray, 2018). Such a trend was less obvious in the case of the MN schema, as this 
schema is at least related with potential harms to societal beings and conventions, which exist 
outside of the boundary, although the schema does not fully address universal issues (Thoma, 
2014). Instead, FR negatively predicted the MN score. Given that the perspective of fairness 
constitutes the basis to critically deliberate upon existing norms and conventions (Emler, Tarry, 
& James, 2007; González, 2002), the strong perception of fairness would be negatively 
associated with the MN schema, which is more about maintaining existing norms instead of 
criticizing them (Thoma, 2014), as shown in the present study. 
The aforementioned associations existed even after controlling for political and religious 
affiliations, which were not fully considered in the models of previous studies. Although Graham 
et al. (2011) argued that the Neo-Kohlbergian theory might be liberal biased and conservatives 
are likely to receive low DIT scores, we found pure contributions of moral foundations to the 
bDIT schema scores even after controlling for political and religious backgrounds. This may 
suggest that the variance in moral judgment development is not completely attributable to 
political or religious orientation but moral foundations per se explain a significant amount of the 
variance. It is consistent with Thoma, Narvaez, Rest, and Derryberry's (1999) argument that the 
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DIT provides unique information about moral judgment development “above and beyond that 
accounted for by … political attitudes… (p. 338).” 
The present study has several methodological implications for future research as well. 
We employed the BMA method that allowed us to explore the best model among possible 
competitive candidate models and address moral uncertainty (George & Clyde, 2004; Raftery et 
al., 1997). The traditional regression method can only test one model against the null model, so 
previous studies that used the traditional method perhaps could not fully explore the relationship 
between variables of interest, moral foundations and reasoning. We successfully explored the 
best models predicting moral reasoning with individual moral foundations and control variables 
with the BMA method. The BMA-identified models showed better performance compared with 
the full models that have been widely tested with the traditional regression method. Particularly, 
we found improved cross-validation performance when the BMA method was implemented. 
Given this, the BMA methods will allow us to address the issue of overfitting that may 
significantly threaten the generalizability and replicability of empirical studies based on 
regression (Babyak, 2004). Finally, we uploaded the data and R code files, which include line-
by-line comments, to our OSF project space (https://osf.io/vtrxu/) so that readers can practice the 
BMA method with a concrete example. By doing so, researchers in moral education who are 
interested in exploring the relationship between variables will be able to employ the introduced 
method, which is more suitable for data exploration than the traditional regression method, in 
their projects.  
In addition, the findings from the present study might also suggest implications for moral 
education. Given the strong association between individualizing foundations and the post-
conventional reasoning, moral educators may consider emphasizing those foundations in moral 
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educational activities, particularly those aiming at the development of moral judgment. Of the 
two individualizing foundations, HC in particular seemingly showed a consistent association 
with the moral judgment development as it showed positive correlation with PC and negative 
correlation with PI. In fact, Gray and Keeney (2015) and Gray and Schein (2012) argued that HC 
shall constitute the basis of moral reasoning in general. Proponents of the MFTs also 
acknowledged that HC is the foundation that is commonly valued across people with different 
political views (Graham et al., 2009). Related to this point, Greene and his colleagues, who 
proposed the dual-process model in moral judgment, suggested that HC can be utilized as a 
referencing source in solving complex moral problems that are involved in conflicts between 
different values and views through the deliberative process (Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010; 
Greene, 2014). Given that the modern world has been highly diversified and we can see the 
increasing trend of conflicts between different cultures and orientations, it would be necessary to 
emphasize HC as the core feature in moral education (e.g., perceiving potential harms to others’ 
wellbeing (Rest & Narvaez, 1994), caring about others’ pains and concerns (Colby & Damon, 
1992)) to address the aforementioned current social problem in the long term. 
As a possible direction for further investigations using the bDIT, researchers may 
consider examining the association between automatic and behavioral aspects of moral judgment 
and moral foundations with the bDIT. Because the present study primarily aimed at exploring the 
association between moral foundations and moral judgment, we focused on the explicit outcomes 
of the bDIT, the schema scores. However, the bDIT has been developed to measure participants’ 
behavioral responses to dilemmas, such as the reaction time, that can be used as proxies for 
automatic, implicit, and unconscious aspects of moral judgment. In fact, the first study that 
employed the bDIT also examined the relationship between moral judgment development, moral 
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competence, and behavioral responses (Han, Dawson, Thoma, et al., 2020). Thus, given that the 
MFT has been proposed conceptually based on the social intuitionist model (Graham et al., 
2009), an approach to explain people’s moral decision-making processes as automatic and 
intuitive processes (Haidt, 2001), examining the relationship between moral foundations and 
intuitive and automatic aspects of moral judgment with the bDIT would be informative for 
improving our knowledge about how moral judgment occurs in the reality. 
There are several limitations in the present study that warrant further studies. First, 
although the prior research reported several preliminary findings that suggested the association 
between moral foundations and moral functioning in general, we only focused on moral 
judgment and reasoning in the present study. Given that other domains in moral functioning were 
out of the scope of the current study, further investigations are necessary to examine the 
aforementioned association. Second, we collected data from college students, so findings from 
the present study might not be completely generalized across different groups. Third, we used 
political and religious affiliation information instead of actual political and religious orientations 
as control variables. To address these limitations, future studies that recruit participants from 
diverse backgrounds and employ the multidimensional scales for political and religious 
orientations. 
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